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Physician's Use of Hospital Facilities:
Right or Privilege?
Jewel Hammond Mack*
Let's suppose that one day you saw a sign which read:
DOCTORS
Bring your Patients to Welcome Hospital
THE BEST IN THE NATION
Modern Convenient Reasonable
The Interest of the Patient comes First
Before you make your choice, come in and talk with us
Immediate admittance for emergency patients.
If the need for such a sign ever existed, the entire picture
of modern hospital facilities would change, for the physician as
well as for the patient.
For a revelation of the picture as it really exists today, one
needs only to look at any recent public health statistics on avail-
able facilities for the practicing physician and his patients in most
large metropolitan areas. They show how limited the situation
is, in both public and private hospitals. Besides the fact that an
overall shortage of facilities exists, in addition there are further
limitations for some physicians who for one reason or another
find themselves forced into still narrower limits even within the
overall limits, while some physicians find themselves excluded
altogether. In many instances the patient is delayed while he
himself makes the necessary connections; or he finds himself
forced to place his confidence in a physician not of his own
choice; or, he may find himself excluded altogether.
The physician's primary concern is to keep his pledge to
each and every one of his patients-to those who require hospital
care as well as those who do not require hospitalization. Should
he be forced into a limited "transient-type" practice, as far as
hospitals are concerned, when he is certified to engage in a spe-
cialized field of medicine? To ask the question is to answer it.
It is a patient's right to choose his attending physician,
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1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
whether the patient requires hospital care or not. Should the
patient be forced to forsake the physician in whom he has placed
his confidence, because his own physician has no hospital privi-
leges; or, should he be forced to wait longer than he normally
would, because his physician has privileges at only one hospital,
which at the time has no available space? To ask that question,
too, is to answer it.
In a recent case decision' the plaintiff (physician) sought to
enjoin the defendant (hospital) from denying to him the use of
its facilities in performing operations. He claimed that the rules
and regulations of the hospital were arbitrary, and that the action
of the board in curtailing his activities there without a hearing
was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights. The
Court, in affirming the judgment for the defendant, based its
decision on these factors:
(1) The hospital was not a municipal corporation, but a
private hospital; and
(2) Injunction was an improper action to bring, because 2 the
plaintiff could show no irreparable injury.
The latter point,' involving irreparable injury as discussed
by the learned judge, raises this query: Can such injury to a
physician who has dedicated himself to the aid of humanity be
measured in terms of dollars and cents? Is not the well-being of
the patient of foremost concern, regardless of the income of
the physician? Usually, too, denial of hospital privileges results
in diminution of the physician's income. Moreover, one dis-
gruntled patient can do more harm than fifty satisfied ones can
do good.
I am inclined to think that the decisive factors should be the
qualifications 4 of the particular physician and the standards
which the hospital is trying to maintain; not questions of tort
or corporation law.
This brings us to the first point upon which the court based
its decision, and the distinction upon which most courts base
1 Edson v. Griffin, 21 Conn. Sup. 55, 144 A. 2d 341, (1958), holding that pri-
vate hospital has the right to exclude any physician practicing therein,
within the sound discretion of its managing authorities.
2 Ibid. Irreparable injury normally is an essential element of an action
for injunction.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. A private hospital could properly limit a physician's right to prac-
tice in the hospital as he had practiced in the past; without regard to his
qualifications.
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decisions in such cases. The court differentiated between a public
corporation and a private corporation, saying: 5
The distinction between a public and private corporation ha5
long been recognized. A public corporation is an instru-
mentality owned in the public interest, supported by public
funds, and governed by those deriving their authority from
the state. Public institutions such as state, county, and city
hospitals and asylums are owned by the public and are de-
voted chiefly to public purposes. . . . On the other hand, a
corporation organized by permission of the legislature, sup-
ported largely by voluntary contributions, and managed by
officers and directors who are not representative of the state
or any political subdivision, is a private corporation, al-
though engaged in charitable work or performing duties
similar to those of public corporations.6
The mere fact that the hospital receives State aid, financial
assistance from the General Assembly, special grants from sur-
rounding towns, or contributions from the United Fund or Com-
munity Chest, does not change its status when the majority of
its income is derived from charges for its services. Generally,
moreover, equity will not interfere with internal management
of a private corporation, unless its acts are fraudulent, illegal, or
ultra-vires.7
The real test is whether or not, under the charter or cor-
porate powers granted, the hospital administration has reserved
the right to manage and control its own affairs.s Courts will not
interfere with the internal management of a private corporation,
but will leave questions of policy and management solely to the
honest decisions of the officers and directors; and this rule ap-
plies to private hospitals."
In the Levin case, 10 a physician who was denied hospital
privileges alleged, inter alia, that the rules and regulations of
the medical staff constituted a restraint of trade in violation of
5 Ibid. See, generally, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations & Assns. (1956).
6 See also, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 17
U. S. 518, 669, 4 L. Ed. 6291 (1819); Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 289
Ky. 123, 126, 158 S. W. 2d 159 (1942).
7 West Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla., 1953); Hay-
man v. City of Galveston, 273 U. S. 414, 416, 47 S. Ct. 363, 71 L. Ed. 714
(1927).
8 Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, 186 Md. 174, 178, 46 A. 2d 298 (1946);
Washington Home of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 422, 425, 41
N. E. 893, 29 L. R. A. 798 (1895).
9 Ibid. Levin v. Sinai Hospital.
10 Ibid. See also: Raney v. Montgomery County Comm., 170 Md. 183 A. 548
(1936); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176, 125
A. L. R. 1339 (1939).
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the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U. S. C. A., secs. 1-3) in that
the defendant's officers and agents had "combined and conspired
to prevent him from treating his patients ... (and that the) action
of the defendant, its officers and agents, has restricted the prac-
tice of his profession and injured his reputation and professional
standing; that the rules and regulations of the medical board,
the governing body of the medical staff, which were approved as
by-laws by the board of officers, are arbitrary and discriminatory,
as he has been refused private rooms for his patients on many
occasions, and the object of the creation of (the) 'courtesy staff'
was to limit the privileges to those who were empowered to make
a private sanitarium out of this public institution." Again the
question of private vs. public corporation was raised, and de-
cided as in the above-cited case. As to the constitutional ques-
tion, the Court said that a monopoly is more than a "mere privi-
lege" to carry on a trade or business or to deal in a specified
commodity. It is an exclusive privilege which prevents others
from engaging therein. A grant of privileges, even though mo-
nopolistic in character, does not constitute a monopoly in the con-
stitutional sense, when it is reasonably required for the protec-
tion of some public interest, or when given in return for some
public service, or when given in reference to some matter not of
common right."
In the West Coast case 12 there was a physician with these
qualifications:
Doctor of Medicine --------- University of Virginia
U. S. Navy Hospital -------- 1 year apprenticeship
World War II ------------- 18 mos. in Pacific Theatre,
performing over two hun-
dred (200) major surgical
operations.
Resident in Surgery, Pathology and Gynecology; Fellow
of Royal College of Surgeons in Canada; and Diplomate
of American Board of Surgery.
He was denied hospital privileges, and brought action. The
Supreme Court of California, in reversing the decision of the
11 Levin v. Sinai Hospital, supra, n. 8. See also: Bryant v. City of Lake-
land, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106, 110 (1947). Even though the hospital be a
public hospital, petitioner as a physician had no right (per se) to practice
in the hospital, it being a privilege rather than a right. Hughes v. Good
Samaritan Hospital, 289 Ky. 123, 128 S. W. 2d 159 (1942). A private hospital
may be supported by appropriations by the state, the county, or a munic-
ipality, without thereby becoming a public hospital.
12 West Coast Hosp. Ass'n. v. Hoare, and Hayman v. City of Galveston,
both supra, note 7.
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lower court for the plaintiff, again decided this question on the
distinction between public and private corporations, saying that
the defendant hospital was a private corporation.
In an Iowa case' 3 the court said:
The decisive factor in this action is the fact that the
Sisters of Mercy Hospital is a private corporation and has
operated Mercy Hospital as a private business. The fact
that its services are available to the public does not make it a
public corporation, whether for pay or as charity. Being a
private corporation, the Sisters of Mercy had the right to
make rules and regulations respecting patients and phy-
sicians, and to conduct the hospital as they saw fit, as long
as its acts or omissions were not fraudulent, illegal, ultra-
vires, intentionally, negligently, or otherwise wrongfully in-
jurious to another. In which event, it would be liable as any
other private corporation, so offending.
The West Coast decision stated the rule very bluntly, thus:
A physician has no vested or constitutional right to
practice in a hospital, but merely a privilege which may be
granted or denied even though his qualifications are of the
highest, and without assigning any reason therefor.
14
Most authorities base their views of the constitutionality of
such exclusion not even upon the application of reasonable rules
necessary to maintain an accredited standing, but upon the cor-
poration law right of a private corporation to manage its own
internal affairs.1 5 The fact that hospitals supposedly exist only
as facilities for medical treatment is blandly ignored.
Would the situation be the same for hospitals that are public
or quasi-public corporations? As stated in American Juris-
prudence: 16
It seems to be the practically unanimous opinion that
private hospitals have the right to exclude licensed phy-
sicians from the use of the hospital and that such exclusion
rests within the sound discretion of the managing authori-
ties. This is not, however, the rule applied to public hos-
pitals, since a regularly licensed physician and surgeon has
a right to practice in the public hospital of the state so long
as he stays within the law and conforms to all reasonable
13 Natale v. Sisters of Mercy of Council Bluffs, 52 N. W. 2d 701, 708 (Iowa,
1952). See also: Van Campeu v. Olean General Hospital, 21 App. Div. 204,
205 N. Y. S. 554, 239 N. Y. 615, 147 N. E. 219 (1925); Piedmont Memorial
Hospital v. Guilford County, 218 N. C. 673, 12 S. E. 2d 265 (1940); and Oleck,
supra, n. 5.
14 West Coast case, supra, n. 7, 12.
15 Henderson v. Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S. W. 2d 697, 60 A. L. R. 652
(1928). See also: 26 Am. Jur., Sec. 9, p. 592.
16 26 Am. Jur., Sec. 9 p. 592.
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rules and regulations of the institutions. Neither a city nor
the authorities of a public hospital can prescribe rules or
regulations for the conduct of physicians and surgeons prac-
ticing in such hospital that contravene or conflict with state
laws.
In one case 7 the court said:
To contend that being a resident taxpayer and practicing
physician of the City gives him a constitutional right to the
unrestricted use of the facilities of a hospital provided by
the City presents a test of our constitutional theory that we
have not heretofore been confronted with . . . When the
City furnished the facilities and takes the risk against their
negligent use, it is not too much to require that he who
wields the knife does so in the philosophy of the twentieth,
rather than in that of the eighteenth century.
Although the recent trend has been toward general liability
of non-profit hospitals for torts, this liability has been based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. But the legal relation of
respondeat superior18 does not exist between a non-staff, prac-
ticing physician and a hospital. Thus the argument of liability
for "negligent use of facilities," as stated in the Green case, has
to rest solely on the idea of upholding such standards as will
insure the best welfare of the citizens of the community. That
case, however, did state that rules regarding qualifications of
surgeons to use facilities of the hospital must be reasonable. 19
This merely begs the question: "What are reasonable regu-
lations?" Are they necessarily impartially and not arbitrarily
enforced? In the last cited case the plaintiff was said not to have
met the standards set by the American Medical Association and
American College of Physicians and Surgeons. Nevertheless, as
a practicing physician, he was allowed restricted privileges.
One court has even held that though the hospital in question
was a public hospital, owned and operated by the municipality:
Even though the hospital be a public hospital, petitioner as
a physician had no right (per se) to practice in the hospital,
it being a privilege rather than a right.20
17 Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 342, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944).
Standard of skill cannot be judged by experience alone. Selden v. City
of Sterling, 316 Ill. App. 455, 462, 45 N. E. 2d 329 (1942).
18 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
N. Y. abandoned the charitable immunity doctrine in Bing v. Thunig, 143
N. E. 2d 3 (N. Y., 1957). But see: Morwin v. Albany Hospital, 7 A. D. 2d
582, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 85 (1959); which seems to shift liability from the hos-
pital to the staff physician (e. g., as for malpractice).
19 Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920). See also: City
of Miami v. Oates, 10 So. 2d 721 (Fla., 1942).
20 Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106, 110 (1946).
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In another case, where there was no question whether or
not the hospital was public, the court said:
It is not incumbent upon the City to maintain a hospital for
the private practice of medicine, nor does a physician have a
constitutional right to practice his profession in the City's
hospital.2 1
In another case, the physician brought before the court the
question of the constitutionality of a statute.22 The court held
that the physician did not have sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the action to test the constitutionality-his interest
being only that infinitesimal interest that a physician has in one
patient; therefore, there could be no injury to him.
Most physicians, however, will strongly disagree with that
view. The doctor's interest in each and every patient's well-
being is surely more than "infinitesimal," and this interest has a
direct bearing first on the well-being of his patient, and secondly,
on the success of the physician's practice. A sound medical
practice is not built by treatment of "transient" patients, where
the physician can only send his patients to other, hospital-
privileged doctors. If the physician is not only trained but certi-
fied, as able to take care of his patients at hospital as well as at
his office or home, it is obviously wrong for him not to be allowed
to do so. As evidenced by the cases cited herein, it seems that
the law on this point, as it exists today, has far-reaching in-
jurious effects.
The issue is clear: Do the hospitals exist primarily as cor-
porations (business entities), of primary concern only as
"private preserves" governed solely as their administrators
wish?
Or do the hospitals exist primarily as facilities for medical
aid to the public; as instrumentalities for physicians to use in
aiding the public?
Put otherwise, the issue is: Do doctors exist for the con-
venience of hospitals, or hospitals for the convenience of doctors?
Should public interests or hospital-management interests come
first?
The answers are obvious. The law as it is now is contrary
to the public's interests.
21 Hayman v. City of Galveston, supra, note 7; Newton v. Board of County
Commissioners of County of Weld, 86 Colo. 446, 282 P. 1068 (1929).
22 Tilleston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582, 588, 318 U. S. 44, 87 L.
Ed. 603, 63 S. Ct. 493 (1943).
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